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This case provides students the opportunity to apply strategic var-
iance analysis (SVA) methodology in analyzing the performance
changes realized in an airline merger. The U.S. Airways–America
West merger provides an example of a complex, strategic action
that simultaneously impacts ﬁrm size, unit pricing and costs,
efﬁciency, and capacity for the combining airlines. This merger
provides a rich example for the analysis since it combines U.S.
Airways, a higher cost network airline that is geographically
focused on the Eastern U.S., with America West, a low cost airline
operating primarily along the Western U.S. The case includes
merger and acquisition (M&A) theory discussing market power
vs. efﬁciency motives for mergers and discusses the role of the
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in eval-
uating M&As and their impact on markets. The case asks students
to serve as consultants applying the SVA methodology to the past
U.S. Airways–America West merger and provide conclusions.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
In 2005, the U.S. Airways merger combined U.S. Airways and America West Airlines into the new
U.S. Airways. This followed several acquisitions made by other large domestic airlines operating in the
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its position relative to the large U.S. network airlines (Delta, United, American, etc.) and low-cost air-
lines (Southwest, Jet Blue, etc.). In the years following the U.S. Airways merger, Delta Airlines acquired
Northwest Airlines. United Airlines broke off negotiations with Continental Airlines, entered discus-
sions with U.S. Airways, and eventually returned to negotiations with Continental. On May 3, 2010,
United announced its merger with Continental Airlines.
As the industry continued to change and consolidate, speculation about a combination between
U.S. Airways and bankrupt American Airlines grew, leading investors to question how the previous
merger between U.S. Airways and America West affected growth, pricing, efﬁciency and capacity in
U.S. Airways’ post-merger operations. Questions raised included: (i) how did the U.S. Airways–
America West merger affect its operating performance? (ii) to what degree were the changes in oper-
ating performance driven by growth, changes in pricing or input costs, productivity, or managing
capacity? and (iii) did these changes in operating performance match synergies predicted by theories
of efﬁciency and market power or U.S. Airways’ management?
2. The U.S. Airline Industry
2.1. Industry conditions
The 1990s were good years for the U.S. Airline Industry. Growth in passenger trafﬁc and airline
proﬁtability was generally favorable. However, conditions in the industry changed dramatically with
the 9–11 attacks in 2001. Demand for airline tickets dropped signiﬁcantly (see Exhibit 1). Airlines with
high ﬁxed costs, particularly the large network airlines (American, Delta, United. . .), experienced
declining margins. Variable costs associated with fuel expense and labor costs were also putting pres-
sure on margins.
Competitive action was also changing the industry. Many airlines looked to restructuring (includ-
ing bankruptcy) and mergers and acquisitions as ways of returning to proﬁtability. For example,
American Airlines acquired Reno Air in 1998 and TWA in 2001. Delta and United launched low-cost
subsidiaries aimed at competing with the growth of Southwest and Jet Blue. The recent acquisition
of Northwest Airlines by Delta and the merger of United and Continental reduced the number of large
competitors in the industry and put pressure on U.S. Airways and American Airlines to follow the con-
solidation trend.
Three groups of competitors formed within the airline industry: network airlines operating hub-
and-spoke routes across the U.S. market, low-cost airlines operating point-to-point routes typically
from secondary airports in metropolitan markets servicing vacation travelers, and regional, commuter
airlines afﬁliated with large network airlines operating short ﬂights into the larger airline’s hubs. Prof-
its varied widely across the industry, but low-cost and commuter airlines tended to have stronger
ﬁnancial performance than the major network airlines. Aggressive pricing also allowed the low-cost
and regional airlines to take market share from the network airlines (see Exhibits 2 and 3).
At the time of the U.S. Airways merger, the industry was experiencing a mild recovery in demand.
Airlines with favorable relative costs were positioned to take advantage of emerging industry growth.
The major network airlines reduced costs associated with wages and salaries, commissions paid to
agents, purchased services, aircraft, landing fees, and other operating expense on a per revenues basis.
For example, United Airlines reduced operating expense by over 23% of revenues between 2001 and
2005. But, fuel costs and aircraft maintenance expense increased. Exhibit 4 provides the total sched-
uled trafﬁc, average fuel cost per gallon and average revenue per RPM1 for U.S. carriers for 2005 and
2006. Despite these improvements, network airlines were still losing money and operating at a cost
disadvantage compared to low-cost airlines. Airlines still wrestling with high operating costs or weak
market positions looked to horizontal acquisitions as a mechanism to strengthen their ability to
compete.1 Revenue Passenger Miles or RPMs is an industry measure deﬁned as the number of miles ﬂown by passengers generating
revenue for the airline. For example, 10 passengers paying for a ticket from U.S. Airways and ﬂying 548 miles would generate
5480 RPMs for U.S. Airways. RPMs are commonly used to evaluate market share between airline competitors.
Exhibit 2. U.S. Airline Industry: market share trends.
Exhibit 1. U.S. Airline Industry Trends: 1996–2012.
Notes: Revenue Passenger Miles (RPMs) is an industry measure deﬁned as the number of miles ﬂown by passengers generating
revenue for the airline. For example, 10 passengers paying for a ticket from U.S. Airways and ﬂying 548 miles would generate
5480 RPMs for U.S. Airways. It is commonly used to evaluate market share between airline competitors. Available Seat Miles
(ASMs) is an industry measure deﬁned as the number of miles ﬂown by each seta in the plane, irrespective of whether it was
occupied (i.e., paid for) or not. For example, a 100-seat U.S. Airways airplane ﬂying 548 miles would generate 54,800 ASMs for
U.S. Airways. ASMs commonly represent airplane or airline capacity.
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idation, with horizontal combinations of Delta-Northwest and United-Continental. At one time, U.S.
Airways was in discussions with United Airlines about a possible merger, but the discussions ended
when United shifted its attention to Continental. The consolidation of the industry continued to be dri-
ven by the poor proﬁtability of the industry competitors. Price competition from low-cost competitors,
high ﬁxed costs, and ﬂuctuations in variable costs such as fuels caused periodic losses for the larger
Exhibit 3. U.S. Airline Industry market share information.
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tural challenges facing the industry.
2.2. Airways (pre-merger)
U.S. Airways, created in 1939 under the name All American Aviation Company, grew via acquisi-
tions to become one of the larger airlines in the United States. It acquired many regional airlines such
as Mohawk Airlines (New York and New England), Pennsylvania Commuter Airlines (Pennsylvania),
and Paciﬁc Southwest Airlines (California) in its expansion into a national airline. Its largest acquisi-
tion occurred in 1989 when it purchased Piedmont Airlines, strengthening its position in the East
Coast market. In 2000, U.S. Airways accepted a takeover offer from United Airlines, but the merger
was blocked by the U.S. Justice Department.
In 2003, U.S. Airways experienced a 24% drop in revenues and posted a $174 million loss. It ﬁled for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and started restructuring its debt and labor contracts. During bank-
ruptcy, U.S. Airways announced a plan to merge with America West in 2005.
2.3. America West
America West was launched in 1981, as a low-cost regional airline operating in the southwest Uni-
ted States. At the time of its merger with U.S. Airways, America West operated a hub in Phoenix and
Las Vegas serving over 100 destinations. In 2005, America West was the second largest low-cost air-
line in the United States based on revenue.
America West experienced bankruptcy restructuring in the early 1990s, emerging with support
from partners Continent Airlines and Mesa Airlines. After emerging from bankruptcy, America West
launched an expansion into the eastern U.S. based from a hub in Columbus, Ohio. It eliminated routes
Exhibit 4. Selected U.S. Airline Industry data.
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launched and innovations such as e-ticketing and online ticket sales were implemented.3. The U.S. Airways merger
3.1. Introduction
M&A in the airline industry is a relatively new strategic activity. During most of the industry’s his-
tory, M&A between competitors was not allowed due to industry regulations. In 1978, these con-
straints were relaxed as the industry was de-regulated and horizontal M&As were allowed for the
purpose of generating efﬁciencies. This resulted in periodic acquisitions as the network airlines used
M&A to reduce the level of competition in the U.S. market and eliminate excess capacity.
On May 19, 2005, America West and U.S. Airways announced their plans to merge. The announced
merger of U.S. Airways and America West occurred as U.S. Airways was emerging from bankruptcy
restructuring. The management team of America West assumed leadership of the combined company
with America West CEO Douglas Parker being named CEO of the merged airlines. Along with his top
management team from America West, CEO Parker focused on creating a stronger airline by combin-
ing a struggling U.S. Airways, which was strong in East Coast markets, and America West, which con-
centrated on markets along the West Coast. America West was considered the second largest low-cost
airline behind Southwest Airlines. U.S. Airways was considered a hub-and-spoke network airline that
lacked national scale. The combination of the two airlines would create a national network air carrier
with the efﬁciencies of a low-cost carrier.3.2. Stated goals of U.S. Airways–America West merger
CEO Parker suggested a number of synergies resulting from combining U.S. Airways and America
West. First, the geographic markets were complementary. For example, pre-merger ﬂyers from the
East Coast traveling beyond the U.S. Airways geographic market were required to transfer to a com-
petitor airline to complete their journey. Or, they might ticket with a larger competitor for a direct
ﬂight. The same issue faced an America West passenger traveling beyond the geography served by
America West. By combining the operations of U.S. Airways and America West, the company expected
to increase revenues as routes and connections across geographic markets were implemented. The
combined passenger volume of the larger airline could also justify extending its geographic market.
CEO Parker announced plans to re-enter the Hawaiian market speciﬁcally. He estimated new revenues
from improved connections and expanded markets would be $150–$200 million (Carey, 2005).
310 P.A. Mudde, P.R. Sopariwala / J. of Acc. Ed. 32 (2014) 305–322Unproﬁtable routes could be eliminated, allowing cost savings in personnel servicing these routes,
in maintenance expense, in fuel costs, etc. (Carey, 2005). By eliminating unproﬁtable routes, CEO Par-
ker estimated U.S. Airways could reduce post-acquisition costs by $150–$200 million. Where possible,
U.S. Air and America West ﬂights serving the same routes could be consolidated, resulting in a single
ﬂight with more efﬁcient utilization of staff, fuel, and maintenance services. U.S. Airways planned to
make improvements in efﬁciency by ‘‘matching aircraft size to route demand’’ (typically measured as
passenger load factor2) and ‘‘ﬂying the planes more hours per day’’ (Carey, 2005). These changes were
expected to improve efﬁciency and capacity utilization by an undisclosed amount.
CEO Doug Parker stated that after the merger closed the combined company ‘‘will immediately
integrate their managements, scheduling, pricing, marketing, and frequent ﬂier plans, which will deli-
ver ‘99% of the synergies’ very quickly.’’ (Carey, 2005) The total anticipated synergies from the merger
were estimated to total $600 million. CEO Parker made no mention of changes to ticket prices that
might result from the market power gained by merging U.S. Airways and America West or any plans
to reduce purchasing costs, labor costs, or fuel expense through greater bargaining power with its sup-
pliers or labor unions.
3.3. Efﬁciency vs. market power – M&A goals
As a horizontal merger, the proposed merger required review by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) to examine whether the combined U.S. Airways would
harm consumers by reducing price competition. Prior to this review, the companies involved in the
merger could ﬁle information about their industry, their businesses, and the anticipated operational
synergies associated with the merger. Essentially the merging companies could argue that combining
their operations would allow U.S. Airways to be more efﬁcient, reducing costs, and allowing them to
pass efﬁciencies on to customers in the form of price reductions. Along with reviewing the ﬁlings of
the merging companies, the FTC and DoJ examine the concentration within their industry. According
to FTC guidelines, proposed horizontal mergers or acquisitions in markets with high levels of concen-
tration are reviewed for anti-competitive impact.
The measure used to evaluate industry concentration is the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)
(DoJ, 2010). HHI measures the relative size and distribution of competitors within an industry. To cal-
culate HHI, the individual market shares of each competitor within an industry are squared and aggre-
gated into a sum. Thus, as the size of competitors measured by their market shares increases the HHI
of the industry increases. At the time of the U.S. Airways merger, the DoJ guidelines stated HHIs that
exceed 1800 indicate highly concentrated industries (DoJ, 1997). M&A transactions that increase HHI
by more than 100 points within an already concentrated industry raise anti-trust concerns based on
the DoJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (DoJ, 1997, 2010). The DoJ guidelines were revised in
2010. Updated guidelines identify an industry with an HHI of 2500 as considered highly concentrated.
Industries with an HHI between 1500 and 2500 points are considered moderately concentrated. The
U.S. DoJ and FTC also examined M&A transactions increasing industry concentration by more than 100
points, depending on whether these occurred in moderately or highly concentrated industries. Merg-
ers that increased HHI by more than 200 points typically received greater regulatory scrutiny.
The DoJ closed its investigation on the anti-competitive effects of the America West and U.S. Air-
ways merger, issuing a statement on June 23, 2005. The investigation concluded,
The Antitrust Division has concluded that the proposed merger of America West and US Airways
would not reduce competition, and therefore has decided to close its investigation without issuing
requests for additional information. There is very little overlap between the networks of America
West and US Airways. America West operates primarily in the western United States, with hubs
in Phoenix and Las Vegas. In contrast, US Airways operates primarily in the eastern United States,
with hubs in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Charlotte and substantial presences in Washington, D.C.e2 The passenger load factor is determined by dividing revenue passenger miles (RPMs) by available seat miles (ASMs). For
xample, a passenger-load factor of 75% would mean that the ﬂights are, on average, 75% full.
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end-to-end networks, like those of the merging ﬁrms, can achieve efﬁciencies that beneﬁt consum-
ers. The consolidation of America West and US Airways, which will create the ﬁfth largest domestic
carrier, will enable the merged airline to offer U.S. consumers more and better service to more des-
tinations throughout the country. (DoJ, 2005)
U.S. Airways CEO Doug Parker was concerned about changes in the industry concentration since
the combinations of Delta-Northwest and United-Continental. He knew the industry HHI had
increased. As he evaluated the possibility of combining with American Airlines, he wondered if the
industry had crossed the new threshold of a 1500 HHI and was now considered a moderately concen-
trated industry. He also wondered if combining with American Airlines would increase HHI by greater
than 200 points and result in much greater scrutiny by the DoJ and FTC. With this concern in mind, he
wanted to understand how the merger between America West and U.S. Airways had affected the efﬁ-
ciency and pricing of the combined company. If he could show the efﬁciency gains from the merger
were strong and resulted in savings that were passed on to U.S. Airways’ customers, U.S. Airways
would be in a better position to argue for support of another acquisition, such as American Airlines.
This would help U.S. Airways respond to concerns about a clash with the stated objectives of the FTC’s
Bureau of Competition which was ‘‘committed to preventing mergers and acquisitions that are likely
to reduce competition and lead to higher prices, lower quality goods or services, or less innovation
(FTC, 2012).’’
3.4. Possible performance changes resulting from M&A
Answers to the following questions were important to address the concerns of the DoJ and FTC and
to understand the full range of performance effects of the U.S. Airways–America West merger:
 Did the merged U.S. Airways grow its sales volume between the pre- and post-merger periods as
predicted by management or did sales volumes decline?
 How did changes in pricing and costs affect post-merger performance? Although no changes in
ticket prices or inputs costs were predicted by U.S. Airways’ management to result from the mer-
ger, the airline industry had consistently experienced volatility in prices and costs. Also, theories of
horizontal acquisitions suggest the combined company use its increased market power to raise
prices or bargain with supplier for volume discounts.
 Did the merged U.S. Airways improve its efﬁciency as predicted by management or did the chal-
lenges of acquisition integration negatively affect operational efﬁciencies?
 Did the merged U.S. Airways reduce its cost associated with unused capacity?Was it able to reduce
the excess capacity of its combined ﬂeet of planes?
Showing evidence that customers beneﬁted from operational efﬁciencies and more competitive
prices in a previous merger could help U.S. Airways build a case for approval of a future merger or
acquisition. Understanding performance variances from a previous merger were also important for
understanding the effectiveness of U.S. Airways’ merger integration team and its ability to deliver
the savings and performance improvements in a proposed merger or acquisition. This could also help
in estimating synergies for prospective mergers or acquisitions.
4. The strategic variance analysis (SVA)
Cost/managerial accounting literature recently introduced the concept of strategic analysis of var-
iance, whose methodology is based on the strategic analysis of operating income ﬁrst formulated by
Horngren, Foster, and Datar (2000) and later extended by Sopariwala (2003). The extended analysis
explains the difference in operating incomes between two years as a combination of four components.
The ﬁrst component, the growth component, measures changes in operating income resulting from
changes in sales units, holding sales prices, input costs and input–output relationships constant.
Further, this component can be broken into a market size variance, representing the change in the
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ing the change in the company’s operating income due to a change in the company’s market share.
The second component, the price-recovery component, evaluates changes in operating income
caused by variations in sales prices and unit input costs keeping sales units and input–output relation-
ships constant. This component includes a revenue effect, which measures the impact of changing
sales prices and is set off against the cost effect, which measures the impact of changing input costs.
The third component, the productivity component, examines changes in operating income caused
by changes in input–output relationships (i.e., a company’s operational efﬁciencies), holding sales
units,3 sales prices and unit input costs constant. Finally, the fourth component, the capacity underuti-
lization component, measures changes in operating income resulting from a change in either the amount
or cost of unused capacity between two years.
5. The ﬁnancial and operating data: 2005 vs. 2006
The ﬁnancial and operating data of U.S. Air and America West are combined to determine their pre-
merger (i.e., year 2005) performance and compare it with their post-acquisition, or year 2006. The
necessary data was extracted from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation
Statistics’ TranStats Aviation Database. Panel A of Exhibit 5 provides U.S. Airways’ operating data (i.e.,
revenue passenger miles (RPMs), available seat miles (ASMs)4 and revenue passenger enplanements5)
for 2005 and 2006, Panel B of Exhibit 5 details its operating revenues and expenses for 2005 and 2006
revealing an $890 million increase in U.S. Airways’ 2006 operating income over that in 2005 and Panel
C of Exhibit 5 provides its fuel usage and fuel costs for 2005 and 2006. Panel D of Exhibit 5 reclassiﬁes
U.S. Airways’ 2006 and 2005 operating expenses of $11.3 billion and $10.9 billion respectively into three
groups; fuel costs, ﬂight-related costs (including ﬂying operations without fuel costs, maintenance, pas-
senger service expense, general and administrative expense, depreciation and amortization, and trans-
port-related expense) and passenger-related costs (including aircraft and trafﬁc servicing expenses
and promotion and sales expenses).
6. Discussion questions
6.1. Technical analysis
6.1.1. Question 1
Using the methodology outlined in Mudde and Sopariwala (2008) and the data in Exhibits 4 and 5,
calculate the following variances and components in the blank Exhibits 6 and 7:
a. The Growth Component, which is made up of variances reﬂecting changes in sales volume (i.e.,
RPMs) on (i) revenues, (ii) fuel costs, (iii) ﬂight-related costs and (iv) passenger-related costs.
b. Using the total of the Growth Component derived in 1.a., determine the variances reﬂecting
changes in (i) market size and (ii) market share.
c. The Price-Recovery Component, which is made up of variances reﬂecting changes in (i) average
airfares, (ii) average fuel costs per gallon, (iii) average ﬂight-related costs and (iv) average
passenger-related costs.
d. The Productivity Component, which is made up of variances reﬂecting changes in (i) fuel usage
due to fuel efﬁciencies, (ii) fuel usage due to a change in the passenger load factor and
(iii) passenger-related costs due to higher miles traveled by the average passenger.3 For simplicity, units produced are assumed to be equal to units sold.
4 Available Seat Miles or ASMs are an industry measure deﬁned as the number of miles ﬂown by each seat in the plane,
irrespective of whether it was occupied (i.e., paid for) or not. For example, a 100-seat U.S. Airways airplane ﬂying 548 miles would
generate 54,800 ASMs for U.S. Airways. ASMs commonly represent airplane or airline capacity.
5 Revenue Passengers Enplanements is an industry measure that represents the number of passengers that actually ﬂew on U.S.
Airways’ planes during 2005 and 2006.
P.A. Mudde, P.R. Sopariwala / J. of Acc. Ed. 32 (2014) 305–322 313e. The Capacity Underutilization Component, which is made up of variances reﬂecting changes in
the cost of (i) acquired but unused ﬂight-related capacity, (ii) available ﬂight-related capacity
and (iii) used ﬂight-related capacity.
6.1.2. Question 2
Based on the market share data in Exhibit 3, calculate the industry concentration at the following
points in time:
a. Calculate the HHI for 2005 (prior to the U.S. Airways–America West merger) and compare with
the HHI for 2006 (after the U.S. Airways–America West merger).
b. Calculate the HHI in 2010 and compare with the HHI after the merger of Delta-Continental and
merger of American Airlines–U.S. Airways.Exhibit 5. U.S. Airways – data for strategic variance analysis.
Exhibit 5 (continued)
Exhibit 6. U.S. Airways – explanations for the $890 million increase in U.S. Airways’ 2006 operating proﬁt.
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Exhibit 6 (continued)
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6.2.1. Question 1
Based on the market share data from 2010 disclosed in Exhibit 3, would the proposed merger of
American Airlines and U.S. Airways’ increase the airline industry’s concentration above the 1500
threshold for a moderately concentrated industry? Will it increase the industry’s HHI by more than
200 points? What are the implications for regulators evaluating the competitive effects of the merger?
6.2.2. Question 2
Explain the predictions associated with efﬁciency arguments for M&A and market power argu-
ments for M&A.
a. Given the conditions in the industry, what does the Market Power Theory of M&A predict about
the merger’s impact on the component variances of SVA?
Exhibit 6 (continued)
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the predictions of the Market Power Theory of M&A?
c. Given the conditions of America West and U.S. Airways as they combined, what does the Efﬁ-
ciency Theory of M&A predict about the merger’s impact on the component variances of SVA?
d. How do the strategic variances realized by U.S. Airways between 2005 and 2006 compare with
the performance changes predicted by the Efﬁciency Theory of M&A?
6.2.3. Question 3
Summarize the predictions of U.S. Airways’ CEO on how the combination of America West and U.S.
Airways would impact post-merger performance:
a. What are the predictions of U.S. Airways’ CEO regarding the synergies expected from the merger
of U.S. Airways and America West?
Exhibit 7. U.S. Airways – explanations for the $890 million increase in U.S. Airways’ 2006 operating proﬁt, compared to 2005.
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component variances of SVA?
c. How do the strategic variances realized by U.S. Airways between 2005 and 2006 compare with
the performance changes predicted by U.S. Airways management?
6.2.4. Question 4
Based on the completed SVA, interpret the results of the SVA for U.S. Airways’ management:
a. Has the U.S. Airways merger delivered the performance improvements predicted by
management?
b. Interpret the relationship between the different components and the challenges associated with
integrating two large, complex airlines – speciﬁcally:
i. How have marketing changes affected both price-recovery and growth variances?
ii. Which variances are most susceptible to inﬂuence by external factors?
iii. U.S. Airways’ management suggested that synergies from the merger will be realized ‘‘very
quickly’’, suggesting a short time horizon for an SVA analysis. What types of post-acquisition
synergies are likely to be realized in a short time horizon? What types are likely to require
more time? Would you expect signiﬁcant changes in the SVA ﬁndings if the time horizon
for the analysis included 2007?
7. Teaching notes
7.1. Educational objectives
The focus of this teaching case is introducing MBA students (or MSA students) to the application of
the strategic variance analysis (SVA) methodology [Horngren, Datar, and Rajan (2012) and Sopariwala
(2003)], its use in examining the effectiveness of management decisions and strategies, and the
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West merger; a strategic action that simultaneously impacts ﬁrm size and growth, pricing and unit
costs, productivity, and capacity utilization for the combining airlines. The case discusses the theoret-
ical role of efﬁciency and market power in horizontal acquisitions and the importance of industry con-
centration in the regulation of horizontal acquisitions.
The application of SVA to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) demonstrates the SVA methodology’s
ability to isolate changes in important variances such as growth, price-recovery, productivity, and
unused capacity. SVA provides better information about M&A performance than methods used in pre-
vious research and practice, which focus on general accounting performance or ﬁnancial returns.
The case focuses on two primary learning outcomes: (a) students learn the technical application of
strategic variance analysis and (b) students use the results of their SVA to understand the changes in
accounting performance resulting from a complex strategic action and examine the effectiveness of a
speciﬁc M&A, the merger of U.S. Airways and America West. Secondary learning outcomes include
exposing students to M&A theory, regulatory perspectives on M&A, and measures of industry
concentration.
The case is also designed to develop students’ critical thinking skills and improve their business
judgment, strategic thinking, and measurement and reporting expertise, all of which are part of the
AICPA’s stated core competencies for accounting students (AICPA, 2007).
7.2. Evidence regarding case efﬁcacy
An earlier version of this case has successfully been used in a managerial accounting course
required for the managerial accounting track in the MSA program at a large, research-oriented univer-
sity and in an elective managerial accounting course in the MBA and MSA programs at a mid-sized
university. Combined, the case has been taught to 50 students consisting of 34 MSA students and
16 MBA students. The students had a wide range of undergraduate training in accounting, varying
from no accounting classes to 13 accounting classes. At the master’s level, students’ accounting expe-
rience varied from zero to four accounting classes with the average being 2 previous accounting clas-
ses. The students’ self-reported preparation for the case discussion ranged from a high of 6 hour to a
low of 30 minutes. The average time for reading and analyzing the case was 3 hours.
A questionnaire was administered to students immediately following the case discussion. The stu-
dents responded to the questions outlined in the table below anonymously so they could share their
opinions regarding the case freely. Each question response was on a scale of 1–10 (with 10 being most
‘‘helpful’’). The following table summarizes the students responses to questions related to their
learning:Mean Std.
dev.How much did The Case help you to understand the importance of strategic
variance analysis (SVA)?7.8 1.73How much did the application of SVA to The Case help you to understand the
performance effects associated with changes in sales volume (growth
component of SVA)?8.0 1.67How much did the application of The Case help you to understand the
performance effects associated with changes in pricing and unit costs (price-
recovery component of SVA)?7.9 1.65How much did the application of SVA to The Case help you to understand the
performance effects associated with changes in productivity (productivity
component of SVA)?7.9 1.64How much did the application of SVA to The Case help you to understand the
performance effects associated with changes in capacity (capacity
underutilization component of SVA)?7.6 1.64
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SVA?7.8 1.83How much did The Case help you to understand the ‘‘Efﬁciency versus Market
Power’’ perspective on value creation in mergers and acquisitions?7.2 1.76How much did The Case help you to understand the predictions of U.S. Airways
CEO on value creation in mergers and acquisitions?7.6 1.95How much did The Case help you understand SVA’s usefulness for decision-
making, planning, and evaluating the effectiveness strategic actions in a large
organization?8.0 1.71How interesting was The Case relative to a textbook problem? 8.0 2.15
Prior to this class, about howmany case discussions have you been exposed to in
your graduate coursework?
20 25.48The questions are organized according to two primary teaching objectives. The ﬁrst set examines
whether the students found the case helpful to understanding strategic variance analysis and its
application to the U.S. Airways merger. The scores, ranging from 7.4 to 8.0, indicate that students
found the case helpful in learning SVA in general and the speciﬁc components of SVA. The second
set of questions explores the different theoretical perspective on mergers and acquisition and value
creation. Students also found the case helpful in understanding the different theoretical and practi-
cal predictions related to value creation in the U.S. Air merger and using SVA to examine whether
predicted synergies were realized (scores ranged from 7.2 to 7.6). A number of questions addressed
the general value of SVA, the ability of students to interpret its ﬁndings, and its usefulness in deci-
sion-making and planning. Lastly, the students found the case interesting relative to textbook prob-
lems (score: 8.0).
When asked, ‘‘would you recommend that instructors at other universities use the case?’’ the stu-
dents responded unanimously ‘‘yes’’ and included the following comments:
‘‘the case helped my understanding of SVA and its application to the real world.’’
‘‘[the case] highlights company claims vs. actual company results from M&A transactions.’’
‘‘[the case is] recommended because SVA is a subject I have never seen before and seems helpful/
useful.’’
‘‘In terms of cost accounting cases, there aren’t many that reach outside of the manufacturing
realm. It was refreshing. Also, a very solid and interesting application of SVA on a worthy candidate
of a company.’’
‘‘on top of it being helpful in understanding SVA, it was a very interesting read.’’7.3. Implementation guidance
Presenting the topic of strategic variance analysis the week before the case discussion is recom-
mended. Typical preparation for the SVA lecture and case discussion includes readings and assign-
ments related to strategic analysis of operating income as presented by Horngren et al. (2012) and
Sopariwala (2003). Also helpful is an example of SVA applied to one company in the airline indus-
try, Southwest Airlines (Mudde & Sopariwala, 2008). Using the example of calculating strategic
variances based on a manufacturing example and the methodology discussed in Horngren et al.
(2012) and Sopariwala (2003), the calculations of growth, price-recovery, productivity, and capacity
underutilization variances can be reviewed. Based on the Mudde and Sopariwala (2008) article
applying SVA to Southwest Airlines, the differences in applying a SVA to the airline industry as
opposed to manufacturing can be highlighted. Additional background readings could include the
guidelines on horizontal mergers published by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission.
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7.3.1.1. Introduction to strategic variance analysis (75 minutes). We recommend that one class be used
to introduce and familiarize students with the strategic variance analysis concept using the following
readings and handout, which could be provided to students:
a. Sopariwala (2003). Strategic Analysis of Operating Income: An Extension to Horngren, Foster
and Datar. Journal of Accounting Education 21, 2003, 25–42. [This reading discusses the Strategic
Variance Analysis methodology, initially introduced in Horngren, Foster and Datar (2000, pp.
470–477) and provides the rationale for Sopariwala’s extension of the Horngren et al. (2000)
methodology. This reading uses a simple manufacturing example to distinguish between the
two methodologies and should be an appropriate introduction to strategic variance analysis.]
b. Mudde and Sopariwala (2008). Examining Southwest Airlines’ Strategic Execution – A Strate-
gic Variance Analysis. Management Accounting Quarterly, (Summer 2008), 20–32. [This reading
applies Sopariwala’s extension of the Horngren et al. (2000) methodology to Southwest Air-
lines and should enable students to apply what they learnt about strategic variance analysis
in the context of a simple manufacturing environment, to the real-life example of Southwest
Airlines.]
After concluding the above-mentioned review of strategic variance analysis, the instructor could
present the case assignment, highlighting the technical and interpretive questions, and explain the
student workbook that students need to complete for the next class.77.3.1.2. Technical analysis (75 minutes). This 75-minute class could be dedicated to discussing the U.S.
Airways merger SVA and discussing Questions 1 and 2 relating to the technical analysis of SVA and the
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) respectively.
Question 1 may require the instructor to review the rationale of SVA and its application to evalu-
ating the performance implications of complex, strategic actions, such as M&As. SVA is a methodology
that isolates the performance effects of changes in ﬁrm size (identiﬁed as the growth component),
changes in unit pricing and unit costs (identiﬁed as the price-recovery component), changes in efﬁ-
ciency (the productivity component), and changes in cost of underutilized capacity (the capacity
underutilization component).8 With SVA’s ability to isolate the performance impacts associated with
growth in sales volume (holding pricing, productivity, and capacity constant), it can examine whether
a particular M&A resulted in performance gains from post-acquisition changes in sales volume. With
SVA’s ability to isolate the performance impacts associated with changes in the prices for either products
sold or inputs purchased (holding sales volumes, productivity, and capacity constant), it can examine
whether a particular M&A resulted in performance gains from post-acquisition changes in price-
recovery. With SVA’s ability to isolate the performance impacts associated with changes in productivity
(holding sales volumes, pricing, and capacity constant), it can examine whether a particular M&A
resulted in performance gains from post-acquisition changes in efﬁciency. Lastly, with SVA’s ability to6 We have taught the case in the format of an evening MBA program. The second half of the previous week’s class was used to
introduce strategic variance analysis to students with the help of readings and a simple manufacturing problem. The ﬁrst half of
the class was dedicated to a discussion of the technical analyses and, following a break, concluded the evening class with a
discussion of the interpretive questions.
7 A PowerPoint slide deck including slides (i) introducing the topic of SVA, (ii) showing how the variances for a simple
manufacturing environment are determined using the methodology outlined in Sopariwala (2003) and (iii) summarizing the
results for each component for the strategic variance analysis for Southwest Airlines, as revealed in Mudde and Sopariwala (2008),
is available on request from the authors.
8 In order to assist students in determining these components, a Student Workbook in Excel format is available for the
instructors of this case. This Workbook includes the following worksheets: Input, Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5, Exhibit 6, Notes to Exhibit 6
and Exhibit 7. Input contains all relevant information about U.S. Airways for 2005 and 2006 and all amounts are already linked to
Exhibit 5. Exhibit 4 contains selected U.S. airline industry information. Exhibit 5 contains operational data, ﬁnancial (unclassiﬁed
and reclassiﬁed) data and fuel-related data information relating to U.S. Airways for 2005 and 2006 directly derived from the Input
worksheet. Using the data in Exhibits 4 and 5 as well as Notes to Exhibit 6, students will need to calculate each variance in Exhibit 6
to determine the totals for the Growth, Price-Recovery, Productivity and Capacity Utilization Components. Finally, Exhibit 7, which
is linked to the variances computed in Exhibit 6, summarizes the analysis in Exhibit 6.
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volumes, pricing, and productivity constant), it can examine whether a particular M&A resulted in per-
formance gains from post-acquisition changes in capacity. Each of these changes can be a source of either
positive or negative synergy within a speciﬁc acquisition. SVA’s ability to provide this information allows
managers to understand what types of synergies have been realized and where corrective action may be
required to get the anticipated economic beneﬁt expected from an acquisition. Students may have strug-
gled with the logic of the SVA methodology or its application to the U.S. Airways merger, so starting with
a review of the rationale behind the SVA methodology and the results of the SVA analysis may help to
expose some basic misunderstandings.
Following the review of the technical application of SVA, the instructor should lead a discussion of
the calculation of the HHI based on Question 2.
7.3.1.3. Interpretative analysis (75 minutes). Before commencing the interpretative analysis, it is impor-
tant to have reviewed the technical analysis of industry concentration and SVA so that all students are
interpreting the same set of facts. Since this part of the discussion involves questions that encourage
students to interpret the results, the time required for each question can vary. The instructor should
maintain a ﬂexible plan for managing the time dedicated to each question, with an upper limit of time
for each question to assure that discussion progresses through all of the assigned questions. The
instructor may choose to discuss all the outlined questions or select only some of the questions, allow-
ing for a deeper interpretation of a smaller range of issues. In the following sections, we review in
detail the teaching plan, presenting the solutions to each question and outlining strategies for manag-
ing the interpretive discussion.
Question 1 discusses the changes in industry concentration that affect the level of price competi-
tion in the industry. This has implications for the regulatory environment as well as the post-acquisi-
tion performance changes. Particularly, industry concentration affects whether U.S. Airways can use
market power gained from its merger with America West to improve its price-recovery component
of SVA. Question 2 reviews the predictions of the market power theory of M&A and examines whether
the ﬁndings of SVA are consistent with this theory. It next discusses the efﬁciency theory of M&A and
examines whether the ﬁndings of SVA are supportive of this theory. Question 3 explores the predic-
tions of U.S. Airways’ management and examines whether SVA is supportive of their predictions.
Finally, Question 4 encourages students to reﬂect on the overall ﬁndings, interpret the results for man-
agement, and draw conclusions regarding the realization of synergies in the U.S. Airways merger. The
SVA will show mixed results. Some of the predictions from U.S. Airways management are realized
(productivity improves due to the merger), but others are not (price-recovery does not improve due
to cost reductions from eliminating unproﬁtable ﬂights). The primary realized performance improve-
ments in the post-merger period were not predicted by management (signiﬁcant increases in airfares
and reductions in the cost of capacity underutilization). Management also made no mention of possi-
ble performance problems, or lack of synergies that could result from the merger (losses of market
share and signiﬁcant increases in unit costs).
The value of utilizing SVA to examine the effectiveness of strategic managerial actions is dem-
onstrated by the difference between the synergies predicted by U.S. Airways management and
those realized in the merger. The importance of post-acquisition managerial learning via SVA
is ironically shown by the attempted take-over of Northwest Airlines, while still integrating
the U.S. Airways–America West merger and the current U.S. Airways and American Airlines
merger.
Students can get additional background on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission August 19, 2010, available at the
following website:http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html#4a.
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html#5c.
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The Recommended Solutions associated with this case, along with the Student and Instructor Ver-
sions of the Excel Workbook, are available on request from the authors.
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